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Article 7

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
MASTER AND SERVANT-Employer, discharging employee under contract authorizing termination when deeming employee incapable of profitably serving him, must act in good faith.
Action on a contract of employment between the plaintiff,
Hazen, and C. C. Cobb and another doing business as Cobb Motor
Company. By the terms of the contract plaintiff was to work as
a salesman for the defendants for one year at a stated monthly
salary and certain commissions on sales. The contract contained
a clause authorizing the defendants to declare the contract null
and void at any time should they deem plaintiff incapable of serving them in a profitable manner. After contract had been in force
for four months the defendants discharged plaintiff, he alleging
that there was no provocation for such act. He sued, seeking
damages, setting out as an element, the humiliation suffered by
him as a result of the discharge. Defendants demurred to the
declaration upon the ground that the contract sued upon was
unilateral. Court sustained the demurred and this ruling is assigned as error. (Hazen v. Cobb et al. Florida 1928, 117 So. 853.)
The court reversed the lower court and aftetr deciding that
the contract was not unilateral, since a definite time for employment was stipulated, further held that the clause under which the
plaintiff was discharged did not give the defendants the right to
arbitrarily discharge but that they must have some reasonable
ground for concluding that the employee was incapable of serving them in a profitable manner and that such ground must have
had some relation to the profitableness of the employee's service
and must have been acted upon in good faith. If good faith appeared the court could not inquire as to the sufficiency of the reasons upon which the defendants acted, but if the action of the employers was devoid of any reasonable basis whatever, it would be
insufficient to sustain their breaking the contract and would tend
to show bad faith.
As to damages recoverable in this case the court stated that
they were prima facie, the wages for the unexpired term of the
contract including any unpaid balance due at the time of dis-
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charge for services already performed but that humiliation is not
generally recognized as an element of recoverable damages in
cases such as this.
D. M. Donohue.
Marriage-Bill by J. Walker against Emma Walker to annul the marriage between the parties. Appellant married her
first husband, Jackson, in 1912. He shortly after left her and
three years later, she, hearing that Jackson was dead, contracted
a ceremonial marriage witE the appellee and the parties lived together as man and wife for more than ten years. The appellee
sought decree of annulment on the ground that at the time of the
second marriage appellant had a husband living and undivorced.
(Walker v'. Walker, Ala. 1928, 117 So. 472.)
The court reversed the decision of the lower court with direction to dismiss appellee's bill stating that althbough the law
would consider the second marriage unlawful if Jackson was alive
aLt the time of the ceremonial marriage between the parties in this
case, the marriage, in fact, having been shown, the presumption
of validity arose casting the burden of establishing its invalidity
upon the one who questioned it.
If a woman contracts a second marriage in the belief that
she may do so, but when, in fact, her first spouse is alive, and the
parties to the second marriage, intending matrimony, live together as man and wife until a lapse of seven years after the first
husband is last heard from, an actual common law marriage is
thereby established. Klipfel's Estate v. Klipfel, 41 Colo. 40, 92 P.
26.
Neither of these presumptions is conclusive and the case is to
be decided upon tle evidence aided to what extent it may be by
the presumptions involved. Turner %,.Williams (Mass.) 89 N. E.
110.
In this case the parties had lived together as man and wife
for more than ten years, appellee had acquired a home, to which
the labor of appellant had materially contributed. The evidence
introduced by appellee was thit about thirteen years after the disappearance of Jackson, the first husband, he had been told that
Jackson was still alive. This evidence was not corroborated and
was of itself of little importance. Upon the facts the lower court
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should not have undertaken to annul by its decree the marriage
between the parties contracted by them more tlan ten years before.
D. M. Donohue.
TRIAL-In an action to recover damages for injury to fruit
trees caused by fire alleged to have been set by sparks escaping
from defendant's locomotive, a judgment was had for the plaintiff
and the defendant brings error. (Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Seckinger, Florida, 1928, 117 So. 898.)
The error alleged is the act of the court in ordering a view of
the premises and instructing that a witness for the plaintiff, in
company of the bailiff, go along to point out the boundaries of the
land o'n which the trees were. Three of the jurors went to the
view in a car with the plaintiff and the bailiff, the other jurors
went in a car accompanied by one of plaintiff's witnesses.
The Supreme Court held that even if there was no communication between the jurors and the plaintiff and his witness on the
trip for the jury to have tle view, it was not proper for the court
to permit the jury to make the view in company with the plaintiff
and his witness and it reversed the judgment of the lower court
holding that such proceedings were unauthorized and improper.
D. M. Donohue.
CARRIERS-The plaintiff, Hugh Ryan, brings this action
in trover against the defendant for conversion of a carload of hogs
shipped by the plaintiff from Watertown, S. D. to Worthing, S. D.
Judgment was for the plaintiff and the defendant appeals. (Ryan
v. Chicago M. St. Paul Ry. Co.
The hogs were billed under the usual live stock shipper's
contract, naming respondent, Ryan, as the shipper and also as thje
consignee. Ryan did not accompany the shipment, and when the
car arrived at its destination it was unloaded, and a few hours
later the hogs were delivered by appellant's agent at Worthing to
One Burney, who receipted for them by signing the waybill, "H.
Ryan by G. Burney".
Respondent brings the action on the tl~eory that the delivery
to Burney was unauthorized, and that thereby the railroad company became liable for the value of the hogs as for conversion.
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Evidence showed that Burney bought the hogs from Ryan for
cash sbortly before they were shipped. Burney asked to take the
hogs from the railroad because they had the cholera, and needed
immediate attention.
Before the hogs were shipped, Ryan took his shipper's contract to the Security National Bank of Watertown, anfi the bank
thereafter drew a draft upon Burney, attachted it to the shipper's
contract and sent it for collection to the First National Bank of
Centerville. The'draft and contract arrived at Centerville December 1st, and the car arrived at Worthing, November 29th.
The draft was not paid, but was returned by the First National
Bank of Centerville.
The court held that, where hogs were shipped under live
stock shipper's contract, naming sllpper as consignee, railroad's
delivery of the hogs to the buyer from shipper, who had ordered
the hogs and who had authority from shipper to receive them,
does not constitute a wrongful delivery rendering carrier liable
to shipper for conversion, though sale was for cash and buyer
failed to pay draft. The delivery of goods from seller to buyer,
though conditioned upon buyer's payment for the goods so that
seller retains title, is nevertheless delivery by seller sufficient to
relieve carrier from liability for conversion. Where the live
stock shipper's contract was not in form of bill of lading as defined by Rev. Code 1918, 1131-1133, railroad could make delivery
to consignee's agent without production of contract as is required
in case of bill of lading. This case was decided by the Suprehe
Court of South Dakota, August 10, 1928, 220, N. W. 905.
F. Earl Lambolev.
MARRIAGE-In the case of Ritzer v. Ritzer, thr Supreme
Court of Michigan held that while marriage is a contract, it is also
a relation governed by rules of public policy not applicable to
mere private agreements. Marriage may be dissolved only with
consent of the state or by death of one or both of the parties, and
not by consent of the parties, as is the case in ordinary private
contracts.
"Alimony" is an incident of mariiage, based on husband's
duty to support his wife, and signifies not a portion -of his estate,
but allowance for her sustenance according to l is means and
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their condition in life during their separation, though it may result in division of his estate. The power to award alimony is
wholly statutory. Courts of chancery have no inherent jurisdiction to award alimony. 220 N. W. 812.
F. Earl Lamboley.
'REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS-The parties here
executed a written contract for an exchange of farms, with abstracts to be furnished and time to have them examined by competent persons for merchantable title, the deeds to be executed in
ten days. The deeds were executed from the plaintiffs to defendants, and from one Mrs. Smith to plaintiffs. Her husband had no
interest in his wife's farm, but acted as her agent in conducting
the negotiations.
After acquiring the title, plaintiffs executed a contract for
sale of part of the farm conveyed to them by Mrs. Smith, agreeing to convey unincumbered title, and, in a later action by the assignees of thle contract, were required to pay damages of $1,700
on account of the flowage exception to the title. The plaintiffs
brought this action for reformation of the deed on the ground of
mutual mistake. The mutual mistake claimed was the belief of
both parties that flowage rights expired in a certain year. The
plaintiffs had decree of reformation striking the flowage easement clause from the deed for money damages.
The court held that to reform written instruments on account
of mutual mistake, evidence of mistake and mutuality thereof
must be clear and satisfactory. Purchasers, who were informed
of outstanding easement of flowage before execution of preliminary contract and had independant investigation made by attorney,
to whom facts were known, after defendants' statement as to the
time of expiration of easement, and who took deed subject to easement, failed to sustain burden of showing mutual mistake as to
time of easement's expiration, in suit to reform deed, and mistake,
of any, was "mistake of law". The plaintiffs here did not show
that there was any mutual mistake. (Crane et al v. Smith et al,
Sup. Ct. of Mich.) 220 N. W. 750; 146 Mich. 430; 219 Mich. 493;
23 R. C. L. 367F. Earl Lamboley.
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Authority of agent to sell
property of principal held to confer no authority to exchange
property.
Action by the Hattiesburg Auto Sales Co. to recover a balance of $500.00 alleged due on an automobile sold by it to the
defendant, Mrs. C. M. Eaton, and for enforcement of a purchasemoney lien on the automobile. Eaton v. Hattiesburg Auto Sales
Co., Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1928. 117 So. 534.
Mrs. Eaton, shortly after purchasing a Dodge car, decided
that sl e would prefer a Buick, and entered into negotiations with
one of plaintiff's salesmen for the purchase from it of a Buick.
Defendant alleged that this salesman, whose name was Brannon,
agreed to exchange a Buick with her for her Dodge and the payment by her of $330.00 in cash. The Buick was afterwards delivered to her by Brannon, but l e declined to accept $330.00 as
the amount to be paid in cash by her, and the manager of the
Sales Co., to whom she was referred by Brannon, declined also
to do so. Mrs. Eaton testified that she later had another understanding with Brannon, who agreed that shle should take the
Buick, and that he would sell the Dodge for the best price obtainable, allowing her to pay the difference between that and the
price of the Buick. She alleged that at this time sh told Brannon that the most she would pay, as the difference in prices, would
be $330.00.
Brannon, in his testimony, denied that he had agreed to exchange automobiles with defendant on payment by her of $330.00,
and stated that in their preliminary negotiations nothing was said
about the amount in cash she would have to pay. He also testified that the final negotiations between them ended in Mrs.
Eaton's agreement to make the exchange, and in addition, to pay
to the Sales Co. the sum of $500.00.
It was the contention of the Sales Co. that the agreement by
Brannon to exchange automobiles with Mrs. Eaton was not within the authority conferred on him to sell automobiles, and for this
purpose the manager of the Sales Co. testified that Brannon was
without authority to take other autombiles in exchange for
Buicks, except with the manager's approval, which was not alleged to have been given in this case.
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In passing upon the question of Brannon's authority to make
such an exchange, the court relied on the rule set forth in the
American Law Institute Restatement, Agency (Tent. No. 3) sec.
316, which is as follows: "A manifestation of consent by one person that another, as his agent, may make a contract to sell or sale
of personal property is, in the absence of usage or anything indicating a different meaning, interpreted as not including consent
to make an exch~ange or barter, or a sale for a consideration not
payable in money." The consent by one that another may sell
property for him confers on such other authority to sell the property for cash only, and not to exchange it fbr other property. 2
C. J. 599. Brannon's authority, therefore, to sell automobiles for
the Sales -Co. did not confer on him autlority to exchange them
for other automobiles, and neither a special authority from the
company to do so, nor a general custom or usage from which such
special authority could be inferred was proven.
In answer to defendant's further contention that Brannon had
apparent authority to make such an exchange, the court held "apparent authority" to be "that class of incidental authority which
is implied from the express or declared authority, and which the
third person dealing with the agent may properly assume to go
with the declared authority unless the contrary is made known".
2 Mechem on Agency (2nd Ed.) sec. 721. But authority to exchange property is not implied from or within the apparent scope
of authority to sell property. Woodhard v. Jewel, 140 U. S. 253;
Kearns v. Nickse, 80 Conn. 23. Consequently, the evidence that
Brannon was without authority to exchange automobiles for
others, while probably unnecessary, was admissible. From these
principles, the court b eld that Brannon was without power to
bind his principal by a contract to exchange automobiles with
Mrs. Eaton, and that judgment must be for the Sales Co.
J. I. Canty.
AUTOMOBILES-Negligence of driver operating automobile for owner as negligence of owner-Liability of owner for injury to guest.
Action for damages for personal injuries to Willie Thomas,
against W. A. Carter, caused by the overturning of defendant's
car through the incompetency of a person permitted by defend-
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ant to drive, plaintiff being a guest in the automobile. Thomas v.
Carter, Supreme Court of Alabama, 1928. 117 So. 634.
The defendant was driving his automobile from Gadsden to
Montgomery, one jewel Thomas being his guest. Plaintiff had
occasion to be in Montgomery, and upon the invitation of defendant and jewel Thomas, her daughter, went with them. At Celera,
defendant said he was tired, and at Jewel's suggestion, allowed
her to drive the car. While she was driving, the car overturned,
causing injuries to plaintiff. This action was brought on thbe
theory that jewel Thomas was defendant's agent; defendant, on
the other hand, contended that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence.
Although the question of whether Jewel Thomas drove negligently, thereby causing the accident, was a question for the
jury, the facts authorized and required a finding that she was the
agent of defendant-this, because she was driving with the owner's concurrence and approval, and in furtherance of his purpose
and undertaking to drive the car from Gadsden to Montgomery.
Babbitt, Motor Vehicles (3rd Ed.) sec. 1149. For this reason,
the doctrine of repondeat superior was applicable, even if defendant hd not been in the car at the time.
It appeared from the evidence that jewel Thomas had previously had trouble with one of her arms, on which she had undergone an operation, and that she was nervous; that plaintiff had
told defendant at tlbe time that Jewel was not fit to drive the car.
It was on this ground that defendant based his contention that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, in remaining in the car
when she knew of the driver's incompetence. The court, however, decided that this contention could not be supported, because
of the circumstances in which plaintiff found herself-she was far
from home near midnight of a dark and rainy night-and held
that contributory negligence could not be predicated as a result
of her failure to leave the car, citing B. R. L. and P. Co. v. Barranco, 203 Ala. 639; Birmingham Southern v. Harrison, 203 Ala.
284; Birmingham-TuscaloosaRy. v. Carpenter, 194 Ala. 144.
In answer to defendant's further contention that the driver
miglit presume, and act on the presumption, that a public road
was safe for travel, even at night, and was not required to be on
the lookout for extraordinary dangers of which she had no know-
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ledge, the court held that a traveler on a public road is required
to exercise ordinary care; that is, to act as a reasonably prudent
man would act, considering all the circumstances surrounding
him. 13 R. C. L. p. 462; Dobbins v. Western Union, 163 Ala. 222;
Bradford v. Anniston, 92 Ala. 349.
Since plaintiff was in the automobile at the invitation of the
owner, sh'e was an invitee, and the fact that it was her pleasure to
accept the invitation did not relieve defendant or his agent of the
duty to exercise at least ordinary care for her safety. Galloway v.
Perkins, 198 Ala. 658, L. R. A. 1916E 1190. The court was therefore not required to decide, in this case, whether the driver or
owner of an automobile is liable for injury to one who is in the
car not by invitation, but by mere tolerance, but it indicated that,
if called upon to decide a case arising out of this state of facts, it
would not hold the driver or owner to be liable.
J. . Canty.
CERTIORARI-Use of certiorari for the review of decisions
of the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court on questions of fact.
Petition of E. J. Bolen and another, doing business as Bolen
Bros., for certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review and revise
the judgment and decision of that court in the case of Bollen.Bros.
v. Miller. (Bollen Bros. v. Miller, Supreme Court of Alabama.
1928. 117 So. 462.)
The argument for error in the opinion of the Court of Appeals did not rest upon alleged error of law in that opinion, but
rested on the proposition that tle Court of Appeals did not correctly judge the effect of the evidence and the facts shown thereby. Since there was no question of law involved, the court refused to issue the writ, holding it to be the settled rule of law in
this state that the Supreme Court will not review the decisions of
the Court of Appeals on any question of fact, but will do so only
on questions of law. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Minderhout,
195 Ala. 420, 71 So. 91.
J. L Canty.
AUTOMOBILES-Assault and battery may be committed
by striking another with an automobile intentionally or by driving
so recklessly as to show disregard of human life and safety.
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In the case of State v. Hamburg, 143 A. 47 defendant was indicted for assault and battery. On October 12, 1927, defendant
was driving an automobile, on 4th Street, night was damp and
rainy and street slippery; she operated auto driven by her at a
rate of speed at from 40 to 50 miles an hour. Pedestrians were
crossing 4th Street at its intersection witbW Walnut Street. It
was necessary for defendant to apply brakes to car driven by her,
her auto skidded for 40 to 50 feet and struck an old woman, who
was then crossing 4th Street and severely injured her.
Court in instructing the jury charged that "An assault is an
unlawful attempt to injure another person, with apparent possibility of carrying it out. Battery is the unlawful use of physicial
violence by one person toward another. It is essential in criminal prosecution for assault and battery to show a wrongful intent, such intent may be inferred from facts. That jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that injuries suffered by prosecuting witness, were due to grossly negligent, wantom and
reckless acts of defendant in operating her car to find defendant
guilty. Judgment for plaintiff.
This case is a g9od illustration showing the flexibility of our
laws.
A. I. DeDario.
CARRIERS-Accaptance of express receipt without shipper's signature held binding on shipper and consignee to limited
valuation state (Cummins Amendment to Interstate Commerce
Act "49USCA#20").
Plaintiff, Thomas Windsor, owned and operated a hotel at
Milford, Delaware. He claimed that a basket of laundry belonging to lim, weighing 170 pounds and sonsigned to him at that
place, had been shipped by express from Federalsburg, Md. on
8th day of September 1925, shipment in question had never been
delivered to him. It's value was $146.04 for which this action is
brouglit. Defendant claims that it was not responsible for more
than .50 per pound of shipment, which based on a weight of 170
pounds, would amount to $85.00.
It was conceded that no value was declared by shipper and
that express receipt was not signed by him or on his behalf, but
the express charges based on the rate prescribed by Interstate

142

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

Commerce Commission on a shipment when no value was declared were paid by shipper.
Receipt expressly stated that carrier would not be liable for
any shipment more than .50 a pound unless a greater value is declared at time of shipment.
Jury returned verdict for plaintiff.
Windsor v. American Railway Express Company, 143 A 37. On
appeal court held that the respondent, by receiving and acting
upon the receipt, altho signed only by petitioner, assented to its
terms and the same thereby became written agreement of the
parties. In absence of a statutory requirement signing by respondent was not essential. This signature, to be sure, would
have brought into existance additional evidence of tle agreement,
but it was not necessary to give it effect.
Judgment reversed.
A. J. DeDario.

